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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes
states from denying equal protection of the laws, and state constitutions
contain analogous protections. In several cases, plaintiffs have challenged
state same-sex marriage bans, arguing that such statutes violate state or
federal equal protection guarantees.
Some state supreme courts have held that the state's same-sex marriage
ban violates the state constitution's equal protection guarantees, whereas
other supreme courts have reached the opposite conclusion. This lack of
uniformity is unsurprising, both because the language in one state
constitution might differ from that of another and because, even where the
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
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language is the same, the jurisprudence in the respective states fleshing out
the depth and breadth of the guarantees might differ. What seems more
surprising is that courts cannot even agree about whether same-sex marriage
bans employ a sex-based classification. Yet, if courts are having difficulty
in determining that, then there are important implications both for analyses
regarding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans in particular and
for any analyses of equal protection guarantees more generally.
Part II of this Article discusses federal equal protection jurisprudence,
focusing on the indicia for the differing tiers of scrutiny. Part III discusses
some state supreme court attempts to analyze whether same-sex marriage
bans violate equal protection guarantees, explaining how some of the
adopted approaches are incompatible With current federal equal protection
doctrine. The Article concludes that unless the United States Supreme Court
makes clear how some of these approaches involve basic misunderstandings
of current doctrine, equal protection jurisprudence will either become even
more inconsistent or, even worse, may coalesce around a doctrine rejected
almost half a century ago.
II. FEDERAL PROTECTIONS
Equal protection guarantees are not designed to impose unreasonable
limitations on the ability of legislators to craft solutions to promote the
public welfare but merely to prevent states from arbitrarily imposing
burdens on disfavored individuals. In some cases, it is unclear whether the
state is invidiously discriminating or is simply promoting the public good as
a general matter, which almost invariably involves a distribution of burdens
and benefits to which some will object. To help courts assess in a particular
case whether a classification is legitimate or, instead, offends constitutional
guarantees, the Court has offered some helpful guidelines.
A. The Tiers
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that some
"factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others."' When such factors are used, there is a
presumption that the classification is not promoting a legitimate state
purpose and should be struck down.2
Classifications that likely reflect prejudice are exactly the sorts that are
less likely to be rectified through the usual legislative processes. The Court
1. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
2. See id.
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has suggested that where "such discrimination is unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and
will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."3  Thus, in part because certain classifications are likely to be the
product of animus rather than a desire to promote legitimate state objectives,
and in part because the normal correction mechanism within the political
process may not operate properly when these groups are involved, the Court
will view certain classifications "with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye." 4
To help courts determine whether classifications should be examined
very closely or instead with greater deference, the Court has developed a
system employing differing levels of scrutiny for three different kinds of
classes: suspect classes, quasi-suspect classes, and a catch-all category that
includes the rest.5  Suspect classifications are rarely upheld,6 whereas
classifications falling into the catch-all category are rarely struck down.
Classifications that are suspect will be examined with the closest
scrutiny-a statute employing such a classification will be upheld only if it
is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.! Classifications
that are quasi-suspect will be subjected to somewhat less exacting scrutiny-
a statute employing such a classification will be upheld only if it is
substantially related to the promotion of an important state interest.9
Finally, the remaining classification will be examined with much more
forgiving scrutiny-a statute examined under rational basis review will be
upheld as long as the classification is rationally related to the promotion of a
legitimate state interest. 10
3. Id
4. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).
5. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
three equal protection tests: "'rational basis' scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny").
6. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitutional Design, 11
HEALTH MATRIx 265, 310 (2001) ("Where the Court sees certain touchstones of constitutional
concern such as a suspect classification or the violation of a fundamental right, the government
almost invariably loses .... ).
7. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, The Potentially Expansive Reach of McDonald v. Chicago:
Enabling the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2010 CARDOzO L. REV. DE NOVO 139, 151 ("Under
this standard of review the great majority of government actions are heavily presumed as valid and
are almost always upheld. . . ."), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovollawrence_2010
139.pdf.
8. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[AII racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.").
9. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.").
10. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
1023
B. The Indicia of Suspectness
A classification will be treated as suspect or quasi-suspect under certain
conditions. The classification must involve a group that has certain indicia:
it must be "discrete and insular";" members of the group must have a
disability over which they do not have control; 12 the defining characteristic
of the group must not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose;'" and the group must have "experienced a 'history of purposeful
unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities."1 4 Further,
group membership must be stigmatized by society and thus, for example,
members cannot be expected to be able to secure equal treatment through the
political process.' 5 Where a group has those indicia, it will be designated as
a suspect or quasi-suspect class.16
When a group or class has the relevant indicia, the Court will subject the
classification to increased scrutiny.' 7  For example, once the Court
recognized that statutes targeting women should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny, the Court started subjecting statutes targeting men or women for
adverse treatment to close scrutiny. Then, the Court suggested that
expressly classifying on certain bases would itself be enough to trigger
heightened or strict scrutiny, even without evidence of "targeting" members
of the class for adverse treatment.'1
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end"). One of the most forgiving applications of the rational basis text
was offered in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See id. at 487-88 ("But the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.").
11. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979).
13. See Weber v. Aetna Cas., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
14. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
15. Cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) ("the class is not
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process").
16. But see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Court's current
reluctance to expand the list of suspect or quasi-suspect classes indicates an unwillingness on the
part of the Court to apply the existing indicia to other classes).
17. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("all racial
classifications ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
18. Cf, e.g., Mark Strasser, Interpretations ofLoving in Lawrence, Baker, and Goodridge: On
Equal Protection and the Tiers of Scrutiny, 13 WIDENER L.J. 859, 870 (2004) ("Express
classifications on the basis of race will trigger strict scrutiny even where there is no malicious
purpose behind the classification.").
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The Court has offered examples of suspect status-race,'9 religion,20
nationality, 2' and alienage 22-and examples of quasi-suspect status-
gender23 and illegitimacy. 24  While members of the Court have sometimes
suggested that other classes, "not now classified as 'suspect' . . . are unfairly
burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of
their members,"25 the Court has been reluctant to recognize new suspect or
quasi-suspect classifications.26
This reluctance needs further examination. It might mean, for example,
that the Court is unwilling to add new indicia to the list or to relax the degree
to which a group must have the relevant indicia when another class seeks to
be recognized as suspect or quasi-suspect. Or, it might mean that the Court
is unwilling to recognize a new class as suspect or quasi-suspect even if the
group has the indicia to the same extent as the existing classes. The former
view might be understandable if, for example, great difficulties would be
created were the implicit standards changed (for example, because relaxing
the standard would somehow open up the floodgates to a whole host of
classes no less deserving of special solicitude). 27  However, the latter view
seems much less justifiable because it suggests that suspect and quasi-
19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) ("Government
action dividing us by race is inherently suspect. . . .").
20. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (describing religion as an
"inherently suspect" classification).
21. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(describing the "highly suspect character of classifications based on .. .nationality").
22. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("the Court's decisions have
established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny").
23. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
24. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (indicating that illegitimacy is subjected to
intermediate scrutiny).
25. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. Jon-Peter Kelly, Act of Infidelity: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unfaithful to the
Constitution, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 238-39 (1997) ("The Court, perhaps in response to
the perception that its assortment of suspect and quasi-suspect classes is irrational, has displayed a
reluctance to create any new suspect categories.").
27. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) ("[I]f the large
and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot
themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice
from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the
disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline
to do so.").
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suspect status are not being decided on the merits but, instead, in light of
other criteria. It would be most ironic if a particular group was not given
protected status because some on the Court believed that stigmatizing a
group historically subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities was nonetheless
somehow permissible and appropriate.28
C. Threshold Levels
One difficulty posed by the Court's "indicia" approach is its utter
indeterminacy. The Court has never made sufficiently clear whether a class
must have all or merely most of the indicia, whether certain indicia are more
important than others, or the extent to which particular indicia must be
met.2 9 By failing to explain the degree to which the differing indicia must
be met, the Court makes it more difficult for lower courts to make reasoned
assessments regarding which additional classes, if any, should be recognized
as triggering a higher level of scrutiny. Basically, lower courts might adopt
one of two different approaches: (1) they might simply refuse to recognize
any new classes, instead waiting for the Supreme Court to do so, 30 or (2)
they might examine those classes that have already been recognized as
triggering increased scrutiny and try to discern the degree to which the
28. Cf Daniel Gordon, Comment, Symptoms for Scalia and Texas: Gay Rights and American
Nationalism, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 111, 122-23 (2005) ("Justice Scalia's dissent ...
evidenced a widespread, deep, and enduring animus toward gays and lesbians."); see also Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But the society that eliminates criminal
punishment for homosexual acts does not necessarily abandon the view that homosexuality is
morally wrong and socially harmful. . . ."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as
partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools,
or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a
lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.").
29. For one interpretation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area, see Kerrigan v.
Commissioner ofPublic Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426 (Conn. 2008):
The United States Supreme Court, however, consistently has identified two factors that
must be met, for purposes of the federal constitution, if a group is to be accorded such
status. These two required factors are: (1) the group has suffered a history of invidious
discrimination [citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-32 (1996)] ... and (2)
the characteristics that distinguish the group's members bear "no relation to [their] ability
to perform or contribute to society." [citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (plurality opinion)] ... The United States Supreme Court also has cited two other
considerations that, in a given case, may be relevant in determining whether statutory
provisions pertaining to a particular group are subject to heightened scrutiny. These two
additional considerations are: (1) the characteristic that defines the members of the class
as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not within their control [citing Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)] . . . and (2) the group is "a minority or politically
powerless." [citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)].
30. Cf Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (treating
orientation as non-suspect after noting that "the Supreme Court has never ruled that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification for equal protection purposes").
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existing indicia must be possessed in light of the degree to which the
recognized classes had those indicia."
Consider, for example, the degree to which it is necessary that
individuals in the class be unable to change the characteristic that is the basis
for the classification. Race is very difficult-if not impossible-to
change,32 whereas the same cannot be said of religion.33 The same point
might be noted when contrasting ancestry with alienage-one cannot change
who one's ancestors were but one can change one's alienage status, for
example, by becoming a United States citizen. 34  So, too, it is difficult-if
not impossible-to change one's sex,35 whereas one's illegitimacy status can
be changed much more readily, assuming that one's parents will cooperate.3 6
Arguably, sexual orientation should be recognized as a classification
triggering heightened scrutiny.37 However, the United States Supreme Court
has heard cases involving members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender ("LGBT") community and has never recognized that orientation
triggers intermediate or strict scrutiny.38
31. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Connecticut Supreme Court's
analysis of whether orientation is a classification triggering heightened scrutiny).
32. Historically, legislatures defined race in different ways. Some states determined race by
going back three generations, some went back four, and some employed a one-drop rule. See Paul
Finkelman, The Color OfLaw, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 955 n.96 (1993) (reviewing ANDREW KULL,
THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)). Arguably, it was possible for some individuals to
change their (legal) race either by lobbying the legislature or by moving to another state with a
different definition of who belonged to which race.
33. Indeed, one's freedom to change one's religion is itself protected. See 22 U.S.C.A. §
6402(13) (2006) (discussing internationally recognized rights to religious freedom including the
right to change one's religion).
34. See Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens and the
Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 47 (2009) (noting that individuals can
change their alienage status).
35. Sex reassignment surgery might be understood as making one's body in accord with one's
sex rather than as changing one's sex. See Amanda S. Eno, The Misconception of "Sex " in Title VII:
Federal Courts Reevaluate Transsexual Employment Discrimination Claims, 43 TULSA L. REV. 765,
771 (2008) ("Some transsexual individuals seek medical treatment to correct their physical body.
Transition is the process by which individuals go through hormone therapy and sex reassignment to
change themselves to align with their gender identity.").
36. See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration, 60
MERCER L. REV. 417, 429 (2008) ("The Georgia General Assembly added a provision in 2005 that
allows the parents of a child born out of wedlock to engage in a 'voluntary legitimation' of the
relationship between the father and the child. Under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(g)(2), the mother and
father of a child born out of wedlock can legitimate the father-child relationship if both parents sign
a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity that also includes an acknowledgement of legitimation.").
37. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
38. Justice Brennan suggested that orientation should trigger closer scrutiny. He explained in
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985):
[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's population.
1027
In Bowers v. Hardwick," for example, the Court upheld a Georgia law
making consensual sodomy a crime. The Court restricted its analysis to due
process guarantees40 and did not even address equal protection.
Nonetheless, there is reason to think that the Court would have been
unwilling to find that orientation triggered heightened scrutiny 41 and, indeed,
some read Bowers as endorsing homophobia.42
Even when reaching a more favorable result for the LGBT community,
the Court did not suggest that orientation was a protected classification. In
Romer v. Evans,43 the Court addressed the constitutionality of Colorado's
Amendment 2, which read:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing."
The Romer Court did not expressly address whether sexual orientation
constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class, instead suggesting that this
Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals
once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue
their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been
the object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination
against homosexuals is "likely . . . to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than . . .
rationality." [citing Plyler v. Does, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)]. State action taken
against members of such groups based simply on their status as members of the group
traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny by this Court.
Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40. Bowers only addressed due process guarantees. See id. at 196 n.8 ("Respondent does not
defend the judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the
Eighth Amendment.").
41. See id. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (mentioning a way to avoid "the more
controversial question whether homosexuals are a suspect class").
42. See Joseph J. Wardenski, A Minor Exception?. The Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on LGBT
Youth, 95 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1363, 1394 (2005) (discussing "Bowers, a prominent symbol
of legally-sanctioned homophobia"); see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1453 (9th Cir.
1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court's
willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the government, are clear."),
superseded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn on reh'g by 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
But see Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir. 1997) ("It is inconceivable that
Bowers stands for the proposition that the state may discriminate against individuals on the basis of
their sexual orientation solely out of animus to that orientation.").
43. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
44. Id at 624.
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amendment was unconstitutional even on rational basis review.45 The Court
likened what was before it 4 6 to what had been before the Court in
Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno,47 in which the Court had struck down
legislation targeting a particular class (hippies) on rational basis grounds.48
The Moreno Court had noted that "if the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest. "49 Basically, the Romer Court was
suggesting that the passage of Amendment 2 was motivated by animus and,
thus, had to be struck down.so
Two different points might be made about the Romer Court's analysis.
First, there was no need for the Court to reach whether orientation was a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification if the law at issue could not even pass
rational basis review. The Court noted that "even in the ordinary equal
protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on
knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be
attained."" Thus, because the statute could not even pass that low level of
review, there was no need to reach the question of whether the statute at
issue would pass a more demanding test.
A different point is sometimes made about Romer's citation of
Moreno.52 Justice O'Connor has suggested that the Court has unofficially
recognized two different tiers within the catch-all category subject to
rational basis scrutiny. Economic legislation triggers the least demanding
45. Id at 632 ("Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. First, the
amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.")
46. See id. at 634-35.
47. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
48. Id. at 534 ("The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment
was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food
stamp program.").
49. Id.
50. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 ("laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected").
51. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
52. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
53. See Lawrence v. T:xas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have
consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group,' are not legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a
politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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review because it can most readily be rectified by normal political
processes.5 However, when a law targets "a politically unpopular
group,... [the Court applies] a more searching form of rational basis
review. .. ."5 It may be that the Court has implicitly decided not to
recognize any new suspect or quasi-suspect classes but will instead
recognize gradations within the category subjected to rational basis
scrutiny. 6
Lawrence v. Texas,5 7 the case in which the Court overruled Bowers,
does not cast much light on the level of scrutiny triggered by classifications
on the basis of sexual orientation. First, the Court struck down the Texas
law criminalizing same-sex sodomy on due process grounds, although the
Court did suggest that Texas's statute was also constitutionally suspect on
equal protection grounds.59 Once again, because the classification at issue
was unconstitutional in any event, it was not necessary to address whether
classifying on the basis of orientation should raise the level of scrutiny either
up to the intermediate scrutiny associated with gender or to the heightened
rational basis scrutiny discussed by Justice O'Connor in her Lawrence
concurrence.60  Thus, the Court simply has not offered an analysis of the
appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications on the basis of orientation in
light of the relevant indicia, instead leaving that task to others.
III. STATE COURTS AND SUSPECT CONSTITUTIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS
When state supreme courts have analyzed the constitutionality of local
same-sex marriage bans on equal protection grounds, they often address two
distinct issues: whether orientation is a protected classification under the
state constitution6 ' and whether same-sex marriage bans classify on the basis
of sex.62 The analyses of the latter are rather surprising if only because they
54. See id. at 579-80 ("Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under
rational basis review normally pass constitutional muster, since 'the Constitution presumes that even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes."' (quoting City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985))).
55. Id. at 580.
56. But see id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice O'Connor simply decrees application of 'a
more searching form of rational basis review' to the Texas statute. . . . The cases she cites do not
recognize such a standard, and reach their conclusions only after finding, as required by
conventional rational-basis analysis, that no conceivable legitimate state interest supports the
classification at issue.").
57. 539 U.S. 558.
58. Id. at 578 ("Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.").
59. See id. at 574-75 ("[C]ounsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that Romer
provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is
a tenable argument. . . .").
60. Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. See infra Part III.A.
62. See infra Part III.B.
1030
[Vol. 38: 1021, 2011] Equal Protection
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
are so radically different that they do not seem to be interpreting the same
guarantees. This utter lack of consensus about how to apply the standard
equal protection jurisprudence may bode poorly for future analyses
implicating equal protection guarantees regardless of which group is
claiming to be unconstitutionally targeted by the classification at issue.
A. Orientation as a Protected Classification Under the State Constitution
Several state courts have addressed whether sexual orientation is a
classification triggering strict or heightened review under their respective
state constitutions. When doing so, they consider the indicia articulated by
the Supreme Court, although that of course does not end the analysis. As
should not be surprising, some state supreme courts have concluded that
orientation is not a classification triggering heightened scrutiny, 63 whereas
others have reached the opposite conclusion. 6
Consider the analysis offered by the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health." The court discussed each of
the enumerated criteria, noting that orientation has the relevant indicia when
considered in light of those classifications already recognized as meeting the
articulated standards. The court explained:
Gay persons have been subjected to and stigmatized by a long
history of purposeful and invidious discrimination that continues to
manifest itself in society. The characteristic that defines the
members of this group-attraction to persons of the same sex-
bears no logical relationship to their ability to perform in society,
either in familial relations or otherwise as productive citizens.66
The court rejected that members of the LGBT community were too
politically powerful to be considered a class worthy of protection, noting
that sex was declared a quasi-suspect classification at a time when women as
a class were considered more powerful than members of the LGBT
63. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 629 (Md. 2007) ("Because Family Law § 2-201 does
not discriminate on the basis of sex, burden significantly a fundamental right, or otherwise draw a
classification based on suspect or quasi-suspect criteria, rational basis review is the correct standard
of constitutional review under which we consider the Maryland marriage statute.").
64. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) ("for the
same reasons that classifications predicated on gender are considered quasi-suspect for purposes of
the equal protection provisions of the United States constitution, sexual orientation constitutes a
quasi-suspect classification for purposes of the equal protection provisions of the state constitution").
65. 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
66. Id. at 432.
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community are today.67 As the court explained, given that orientation meets
the other indicia and that members of the LGBT community are not as
powerful as were members of another group when that classification was
held to trigger heightened scrutiny, it would be at the very least unfair not to
recognize that orientation triggers heightened scrutiny as well. 68
The court considered whether orientation is an immutable characteristic,
noting that different courts have reached different conclusions about whether
orientation is in fact immutable, 69 but also noting that there is no
requirement in the jurisprudence that the characteristic be immutable.70 One
need only consider some of the classifications that have been recognized as
triggering heightened or strict scrutiny to see that immutability is not
required. 7
The Washington Supreme Court reached very different conclusions
when trying to decide whether orientation triggered heightened scrutiny.72
For example, the court reasoned that because some protective legislation had
been passed, it was obvious that the LGBT community was not completely
powerless. 3  Yet presumably, if the presence of express protective
legislation is indicative of power, then the presence of express protection
within the United States Constitution would certainly seem to be indicative
of power and would obviate the need to find additional protections within
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Yet, were that the relevant test, one
67. Id. at 452-53 ("With respect to the comparative political power of gay persons, they
presently have no greater political power-in fact, they undoubtedly have a good deal less such
influence-than women did in 1973, when the United States Supreme Court, in Frontiero, held that
women are entitled to heightened judicial protection." (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
688 (1973) (plurality opinion))); see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895 (Iowa 2009) ("We
are convinced gay and lesbian people are not so politically powerful as to overcome the unfair and
severe prejudice that history suggests produces discrimination based on sexual orientation. Gays and
lesbians certainly possess no more political power than women enjoyed four decades ago when the
Supreme Court began subjecting gender-based legislation to closer scrutiny. Additionally, gay and
lesbian people are, as a class, currently no more powerful than women or members of some racial
minorities.").
68. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 456 ("Because gay persons, like women, fully satisfy the first three
criteria of the suspectness inquiry, it would be manifestly unfair to the plaintiffs, and to gay persons
generally, to ignore or dismiss the analysis and result of Frontiero, which correctly concluded that
women were not so politically powerful as to obviate the need for heightened judicial scrutiny of
gender-based classifications.").
69. Id. at 436-37.
70. Id. at 437 ("Although we do not doubt that sexual orientation-heterosexual or
homosexual-is highly resistant to change, it is not necessary for us to decide whether sexual
orientation is immutable in the same way and to the same extent that race, national origin and gender
are immutable, because, even if it is not, the plaintiffs nonetheless have established that they fully
satisfy this consideration.").
71. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
72. See Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
73. Id. at 974-75 ("The enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay and
lesbian individuals in Washington shows that as a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless
but, instead, exercise increasing political power.").
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would have assumed that sex could not be a protected classification because,
after all, the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
affords express protection on the basis of sex.74 So, too, one might have
assumed that race would not be a suspect classification because the Fifteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution affords express protection on
the basis of race, which would allegedly establish that racial minorities
were and are not powerless.
The difficulty with the Washington court's approach was not that it
examined whether members of the LGBT community were powerful but that
the threshold degree of powerlessness used to disqualify the class as being
suspect or quasi-suspect was artificially low and might have been used to
disqualify classes that had already been recognized as meeting the relevant
standard. Instead, the Washington court should have considered the degree
of powerlessness of the recognized classes at the time of recognition as
establishing the relevant baseline. 6  Or, perhaps, the court should have
considered the current degree of powerlessness of the recognized classes as
setting the relevant baseline.n
The same point might be made about the Washington court's analysis of
whether orientation is immutable. The court explained that because sexual
orientation had not been established as an immutable characteristic7 8 and
because the immutability of the characteristic was still subject to debate,79
the classification would not be treated as suspect. Yet, this would mean that
religion could not be a suspect classification, since orientation is more
difficult to change than one's religion.so So, too, it is easier to change one's
74. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.").
76. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (noting the Connecticut Supreme Court's
comparing degrees of powerlessness).
77. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) ("[I]f a group's current political
powerlessness were a prerequisite to a characteristic's being considered a constitutionally suspect
basis for differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify the numerous decisions that
continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifications."), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009);
see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is hard to consider
women a 'discrete and insular minorit[y]' unable to employ the 'political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon,' when they constitute a majority of the electorate." (quoting United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938))).
78. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974.
79. See id. at 974 n.6.
80. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 296-97 (1992) (suggesting that it may be harder
to change one's sexual orientation than one's religion).
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alienage or illegitimacy status than one's orientation.8 ' Basically, if the
Washington court's approach were correct, some of the classifications
currently recognized as suspect or quasi-suspect could not be so recognized.
While there is much to be said for the proposition that orientation should
be treated as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, a separate question is
whether same-sex marriage bans already make use of a protected
classification and thus should be examined with at least heightened scrutiny.
Various courts have considered this claim, and there has been a surprising
lack of consensus about how this issue should be resolved.
B. Classifications on the Basis of Sex
Several courts have addressed whether same-sex marriage bans classify
on the basis of sex. Both their conclusions and their analyses have varied so
greatly that one cannot help but conclude that there is no common
understanding about how the equal protection guarantees are supposed to be
applied. But if that is so, then there are important implications for equal
protection analyses more generally and not only those involving LGBT
plaintiffs.
1. Hawaii
More than fifteen years ago, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v.
Lewin82 analyzed that state's marriage statute, which included in relevant
part that "the marriage contract, ... shall be only between a man and a
woman. ... "83 The court made two points: (1) "Rudimentary principles of
statutory construction render manifest the fact that, by its plain language,
HRS § 572-1 restricts the marital relation to a male and a female,"8 4 and (2)
"the Hawaii Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination against
any person in the exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis of sex."85
81. Compare Jonathan Weinberg, The End of Citizenship?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 931, 933 (2009)
(book review) ("In order to become a U.S. citizen, one must first become a lawful permanent
resident; once one becomes a lawful permanent resident, the road to citizenship is straightforward."),
and J. R. Trahan, Time for a Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana 's Intertemporal Conflicts Law
(Law of Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REV. 661, 686-87 (1999) (discussing methods by which
illegitimate children might be legitimated), with Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Note, Defining Family in
American Prisons, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 357, 397-98 (2009). The American Psychological
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Association of Social Workers
confirmed in an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in Lawrence that they consider sexual
orientation an immutable characteristic, stating that it "is a normal variant of human sexual
expression," that "is not a mental or psychological disorder," and is "highly resistant to change."
Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al in Support of Petitioners at 4,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
82. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
83. HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (2010).
84. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
85. Id.
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Basically, the Hawaii Supreme Court examined the express language of the
statute and noted that the statute precluded males from marrying males and
females from marrying females, but allowed males to marry females as long
as no other limitations were violated (for example, the parties were old
enough and were not too closely related by blood).16  The court concluded
that the statute facially classified on the basis of sex.87
A separate question was whether the classification was sufficiently
closely tailored to support sufficiently important interests for such a
classification to be upheld. That depended upon the level of scrutiny
imposed by the state constitution for sex-based classifications-under the
Hawaii Constitution, classifications on the basis of sex are examined with
strict scrutiny. 8
In his Baehr dissent, Judge Heen denied that the Hawaii statute
classified on a forbidden basis, noting that "HRS § 572-1 treats everyone
alike and applies equally to both sexes."89 Yet, it is unclear whether he was
asserting that the classification is not sex-based, because it allegedly affects
the sexes equally, 90 or is sex-based but not invidiously,9 ' because a statute
might classify on the basis of sex, but nonetheless be permissible.92
Judge Heen noted, "A male cannot obtain a license to marry another
male, and a female cannot obtain a license to marry another female. Neither
sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does not have, and neither
sex is being denied a right or benefit that the other has."93 He then
suggested that the statute should be examined in light of the rational basis
86. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.
In order to make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only between a man and a
woman, it shall be necessary that:
(1) The respective parties do not stand in relation to each other of ancestor and
descendant of any degree whatsoever, brother and sister of the half as well as to the
whole blood, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, whether the relationship is the result
of the issue of parents married or not married to each other;
(2) Each of the parties at the time of contracting the marriage is at least sixteen years of
age; provided that with the written approval of the family court of the circuit within
which the minor resides, it shall be lawful for a person under the age of sixteen years,
but in no event under the age of fifteen years, to marry, subject to section 572-2.
87. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
88. See id. at 67 ("[S]ex is a 'suspect category' for purposes of equal protection analysis under
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution and . . . HRS § 572-1 is subject to the 'strict scrutiny'
test.").
89. Id. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 72 ("HRS § 572-1 does not discriminate on the basis of gender.").
91. See id at 71 (suggesting that the classification "does not effect an invidious discrimination").
92. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding
sex-based classification).
93. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting).
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test, 94 thereby implying that the statute did not classify on the basis of
gender. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has already explained that
this is not the proper way to analyze whether a statute classifies on a
particular basis.
Consider McLaughlin v. Florida,95 in which the Court examined
Florida's making interracial fornication or adultery a separate crime in
addition to the state's general prohibition of fornication and adultery. The
Court explained that the statute under which Dewey McLaughlin and Connie
Hoffman were charged could only apply to an interracial couple.98 That
said, however, the Court noted that "all whites and Negroes who engage in
the forbidden conduct are covered by the section and each member of the
interracial couple is subject to the same penalty."99 Notwithstanding this
equal application, the Court struck down the statute as a violation of equal
protection guarantees.' 00 The Court pointed out:
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause ... does not end
with a showing of equal application among the members of the class
defined by the legislation. The courts must reach and determine the
question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are
reasonable in light of its purpose-in this case, whether there is an
arbitrary or invidious discrimination between those classes covered
by Florida's cohabitation law and those excluded.'0 '
The McLaughlin Court explained that a racial classification was at
issue,102 equal application to whites and blacks notwithstanding. A separate
94. Id. ("the issue is whether the statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest").
95. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
96. See id. at 185-86.
Section 798.01 forbids living in adultery and section 798.02 proscribes lewd cohabitation.
Both sections are of general application, both require proof of intercourse to sustain a
conviction, and both authorize imprisonment for up to two years. Section 798.03 also of
general application, proscribes fornication and authorizes a three-month jail sentence.
The fourth section of the chapter, 798.04, makes criminal a white person and a Negro's
living together in adultery or fornication. A one-year prison sentence is authorized. The
conduct it reaches appears to be the same as is proscribed under the first two sections of
the chapter. Section 798.05, the section at issue in this case, applies only to a white
person and a Negro who habitually occupy the same room at nighttime.
Id.
97. See McLaughlin v. State, 153 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1963), revd sub nom. McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964) (suggesting that the defendants were Dewey McLaughlin and Connie
Hoffman).
98. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188 ("It is readily apparent that § 798.05 treats the interracial
couple made up of a white person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple.").
99. Id.
100. See id. at 187 ("We deal with the single issue of equal protection and on this basis set aside
these convictions.").
101. Id. at 191.
102. Id. at 192 ("We deal here with a racial classification. . .
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issue involved an analysis of the statute's constitutionality, which might
include a variety of factors, including that a criminal statute was at issue1 03
and that the classification triggered strict scrutiny.1 04
The same point about classification might be made in the civil context.
In Loving v. Virginia,'o the Court examined Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statutes. 106 The Court struck down the statutes, including the statute that
declared racial intermarriages void, concluding that they were "designed to
maintain White Supremacy."o However, at least two points must be made.
First, the Loving Court noted that the statutes would have been struck down
even were that not the intent'08 and, second, there was no doubt that what
was at issue were racial classifications.1 09
That the Loving Court struck down Virginia's marriage laws involving
racial classifications does not establish that sex-based classifications must
also be struck down. Whether sex-based classifications are constitutional
depends upon the implicated interests of the state and the tightness of fit
103. See id. (noting that the classification was "embodied in a criminal statute").
104. See id. at 192 ("[Rjacial classifications [are] 'constitutionally suspect,' Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 [(1954)]; and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 [(1944)] ... .").
105. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
106. Id. at 4-5.
The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial
marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of the Virginia Code:
"Leaving State to evade law.-If any white person and colored person shall go out
of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning,
and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man
and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be
governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of
their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage."
Section 20-59, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:
"Punishment for marriage.-If any white person intermarry with a colored person,
or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony
and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor
more than five years."
Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which
automatically voids all marriages between "a white person and a colored person" without
any judicial proceeding, and §§ 20-54 and 1-14 which, respectively, define "white
persons" and "colored persons and Indians" for purposes of the statutory prohibitions.
Id.
107. Id. at 11.
108. See id at 11 n.11 ("[W]e find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all
races.").
109. Id. at 12 ("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.").
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between the classification and the promotion of those interests." 0 While the
federal standard used to determine whether sex-based classifications pass
muster is not as demanding as the federal standard for determining the
constitutionality of racial classifications, the former standard nonetheless
requires that "a party seeking to uphold government action based on sex
must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification.""'
Judge Heen's analysis"l 2 was mistaken in at least two respects. First,
one does not determine whether a statute classifies on a particular basis by
looking at whether different groups are affected differently. As McLaughlin
illustrates, a classification might result in an equal imposition of burdens
across groups and nonetheless classify on a basis triggering closer
scrutiny. 113
A separate issue is whether the classification violates constitutional
guarantees, and it might be important to see who is adversely affected when
answering that question." 4 But that analysis does not involve determining
the basis of the classification (that question has already been decided), but
whether the standards used to determine whether the constitutional
permissibility of such a classification have been met.
2. Vermont
In Baker v. State,'" the Vermont Supreme Court found that the state's
same-sex marriage ban violated state constitutional guarantees 'under a
particular provision of the Vermont Constitution-the Common Benefits
Clause." 6  The Baker court began its analysis by identifying the type of
classification embodied in the statute." 7  The court recognized that the
"marriage statutes apply expressly to opposite-sex couples ... [and] exclude
110. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) ("The State must show 'at least that
the [challenged] classification serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' (citing Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))).
111. See id. at 524 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724).
112. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 70-74 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting); see supra text
accompanying notes 89-94.
113. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
114. But see supra note 102 and accompanying text (suggesting that equal application would not
save Florida's racial classification from being struck down as a violation of equal protection
guarantees).
115. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
116. Id at 867 ("We hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples
the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law."); see also VT.
CONST. ch. 1, art. 7.
117. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 ("The first step in our analysis is to identify the nature of the
statutory classification.").
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anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same sex.""18
One might think that the court's recognition that the statute expressly
excluded on the basis of sex or gender would be sufficient to establish that
the statute classified on the basis of sex. However, surprisingly, the Baker
court reasoned that "the marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not single
out men or women as a class for disparate treatment, but rather prohibit men
and women equally from marrying a person of the same sex."" 9 Basically,
the Baker court adopted Judge Heen's method of identifying the basis of
classification, United States Supreme Court precedent to the contrary.120
The Baker court failed to recognize that a statute not singling out a group for
disparate treatment still might be using a classification triggering heightened
scrutiny (for example, statutes that focus on the racial identity of the
members of would-be marital couples). Ironically, the very case cited by the
Baker court in support of its position,121 Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney,122 actually undermined the Vermont court's
analysis.123
The Feeney Court examined a Massachusetts veterans' preference
statute that "operate[d] overwhelmingly to the advantage of males." 24 The
Court distinguished between two kinds of classifications-those that facially
involve a protected classification and those that involve a neutral
classification that might have a disparate impact on a protected class-and
explained that certain classifications "in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy,"125 paradigmatically race.126 Such a "classification, regardless of
purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon
an extraordinary justification." 27 Here, the Court is suggesting that a statute
expressly using a racial classification must be examined with strict
scrutiny-it will not do to say, for example, that the racial classification is
benign.128  Even an allegedly non-invidiously motivated statute using a
protected classification will be examined closely for fear that it is "motivated
118. Id.
119. Id. at 880 n.13 (emphasis added).
120. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
121. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
122. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
123. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
124. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.
125. Id. at 272.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny in
every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications .... ).
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by an invidious purpose."I29
Subjecting express racial classifications to strict scrutiny will not alone
eradicate invidious discrimination, because individuals intent on invidiously
discriminating might try to do so in a more subtle way. After all, laws
classifying on allegedly neutral grounds might nonetheless target on the
basis of race. 130 To prevent individuals from invidiously discriminating via
an allegedly neutral classification, the Court will strictly scrutinize "a
classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext." ,
What would count as an ostensibly neutral classification? Here, the
Feeney Court discussed a classification that involves a non-race-related
term that allegedly was being used to target on the basis of race in a more
subtle manner. The Baker court misunderstood how the term "neutral" was
being used, mistakenly thinking that the Feeney Court was talking about a
policy that was neutral in the sense that the races were affected equally. But
that could not have been the Feeney Court's meaning, because the Court had
just offered McLaughlin as an example of facial racial discrimination, and
McLaughlin involved a racial classification that had been applied to the
races equally.132
To understand what the Feeney Court was doing, it is helpful to consider
the classification that was at issue. The challenged classification used the
neutral term "veteran" that on its face was not associated with gender. ,
Indeed, the Court pointed out that there were both male and female
veterans. 134
Where a classification, neutral on its face, is challenged as offending
equal protection guarantees, the Court uses a specific test to determine
whether the neutral classification has been used to impose a burden on a
protected class. The Feeney Court explained:
When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the
ground that its effects upon women are disproportionably adverse, a
twofold inquiry is thus appropriate. The first question is whether
the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not
gender-based. If the classification itself, covert of [sic] overt, is not
129. Id. at 505.
130. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 306 n.13 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Many
policies whose very intent is to discriminate are framed in a race-neutral manner.").
131. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 275 ("[T]he definition of 'veterans' in the statute has always been neutral as to
gender.. . .").
134. Id. ("Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a way that has been inclusive
of women who have served in the military. . .. ").
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based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse
effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.'
Consider a statute that permits a man to marry a woman but not a man,
and a woman to marry a man but not a woman. Suppose that a court for
whatever reason reads such a statute as gender-neutral. The Feeney twofold
inquiry tells the court to reconsider whether, in fact, the classification is
gender-based. The question to be decided is not whether the genders are
treated equally, but simply whether gender is the basis of the classification.
Only if the classification is not gender-based should the next questions be
considered.
Suppose that a neutral classification is nonetheless challenged as
discriminatory on the basis of gender. Given that there is no gender-linked
term in the statute, the only way that one could plausibly argue that the
classification was in fact discriminatory on the basis of gender would be to
show disparate impact. But, the Feeney Court suggests, where there is no
express classification, one must show both disparate impact and intent to
discriminate. 136
Suppose that the Baker analysis were applied in McLaughlin and the
Court had required a showing of disparate impact even when a facial racial
classification was used. In that event, the Court would presumably have said
that because whites and blacks were affected equally by the statute, rational
basis scrutiny should be used. But this is exactly what McLaughlin did not
say, since McLaughlin imposed strict scrutiny notwithstanding the equal
application. 137
In her concurring and dissenting Baker opinion, Justice Johnson pointed
out that "an individual's right to marry a person of the same sex is prohibited
solely on the basis of sex."' 8 As she rightly suggested, once the gender-
based classification was established, it was incumbent upon the state to
establish that the statute was sufficiently "narrowly tailored to further
important, if not compelling, interests." 39
It is not claimed here that the Baker court was somehow blinded by its
desire to avoid at all costs the conclusion that same-sex relationships should
not be given legal recognition. On the contrary, the Baker court held that the
Common Benefits Clause required that Vermont offer legal recognition to
135. Id. at 274.
136. See id. at 273-74.
137. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
138. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting in
part).
139. See id.
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same-sex relationships, so the court's misapplication of Feeney cannot
plausibly be attributed to that kind of result-oriented reasoning.140
Nonetheless, the Baker court misapplied the relevant equal protection
guarantees in a way that simply cannot account for the existing federal
jurisprudence.
3. New York
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of that
state's same-sex marriage ban in Hernandez v. Robles. 14 ' The court
dismissed the equal protection argument in one paragraph, noting:
The limitation does not put men and women in different classes, and
give one class a benefit not given to the other. Women and men are
treated alike-they are permitted to marry people of the opposite
sex, but not people of their own sex. This is not the kind of sham
equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute
there, prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other,
was in substance anti-black legislation. Plaintiffs do not argue here
that the legislation they challenge is designed to subordinate either
men to women or women to men as a class.14 2
Yet, as the Court has repeatedly made clear, there is no requirement that
one group be subordinated to another in order for a protected classification
to be struck down. 143 Indeed, such a requirement flies in the face of the
jurisprudence; certain classifications are presumptively prohibited because
they are so rarely legitimate. To invalidate a statute that expressly uses a
protected classification only if the statute can be shown to subordinate is to
return to a jurisprudence explicitly repudiated in McLaughlin, where the
McLaughlin Court explained that "[j]udicial inquiry under the Equal
Protection Clause ... does not end with a showing of equal application
among the members of the class defined by the legislation."'"
Not only did the New York court offer an interpretation of equal
protection guarantees that hearkened back to the days of Pace v. Alabama,
where the Court upheld Alabama's punishing interracial fornication more
severely than intra-racial fornication,145 but it also offered a very unusual
140. See id at 889.
141. 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006).
142. Id.atl0-li.
143. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text (discussing Loving and McLaughlin).
144. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
145. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
Section 4184 equally includes the offense when the persons of the two sexes are both
white and when they are both black. Section 4189 applies the same punishment to both
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analysis of suspect and quasi-suspect jurisprudence more generally. The
court considered whether orientation might be a suspect or quasi-suspect
class under the New York Constitution. 146 The court suggested that it might
"apply heightened scrutiny to sexual preference discrimination in some
cases"1 47 but would not when reviewing "legislation governing marriage and
family relationships."1 48
Why are those areas excluded? Because the court decided that a
"person's preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the
birth of children is relevant to the State's interest in fostering relationships
that will serve children best."149  Yet, evidence was presented to the court
that children were thriving when raised by LGBT parents, which is to say
that one's "preference" for sexual partners of the same sex was simply not
correlated with one's ability to parent.'50 That evidence did not win the day
because "the studies on their face do not establish beyond doubt that children
fare equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households."
The New York court's analysis was startling in a number of respects.
First, New York permits second-parent adoption, so two members of a same-
sex couple might each be recognized as the legal parent of the same child. 152
This means that New York accepts that LGBT adults are good parents.
However, the state has nonetheless decided that it will not permit same-sex
parents raising a child together to marry, even though doing so would help
those children 5 3 and would not in any way hurt the children who are being
raised in different-sex families.154
offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the offense against which this latter section is
aimed cannot be committed without involving the persons of both races in the same
punishment. Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two
sections is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of any
particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white or
black, is the same.
Id.
146. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 20.
147. Id. at 11.
148. Id
149. Id.
150. Id. at 7-8.
151. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
152. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
153. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of children, but excluding same-
sex couples from marriage in no way furthers this interest. In fact, it undermines it. Civil
marriage provides tangible legal protections and economic benefits to married couples
and their children, and tens of thousands of children are currently being raised by same-
sex couples in New York. Depriving these children of the benefits and protections
available to the children of opposite-sex couples is antithetical to their welfare ....
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The New York court distinguished what was before it from the "kind of
sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving."ss Yet, the
court failed to pay close enough attention to the issues raised in Loving.
Virginia supported its anti-miscegenation law by arguing that the state's
"legitimate purposes were 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,'
and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and
'the obliteration of racial pride."' 5 6 The state was claiming that the children
of interracial couples were inferior,'17 that children were better when
produced by intra-racial couples than when produced by interracial couples.
What proof did the state have that its contention was true? None. But the
state argued that none was required because the races were being treated
equally; that because equal protection guarantees were not offended by a
statute that did not treat the races differently, mere rational basis scrutiny
should be employed.'" 8 The Loving Court explained Virginia's position:
The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw
miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial
classifications, the question of constitutionality would thus become
whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial
marriages differently from other marriages. On this question, the
State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and,
consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state
legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial
marriages.5 9
With respect to which judgment should the Court defer to the wisdom of
the legislature? With respect to the claim that children would be better off if
they were not produced by interracial couples. Apparently, if the New York
court had been deciding Loving, and if the state could show that the statute
was not promoting white supremacy (for example, because the state could
somehow show that its interest was in maintaining the purity of all races and
not just the white race), then the New York court would have decided the
Id.
154. Id at 30 ("while encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before they have children is
certainly a legitimate interest of the State, the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage in no
way furthers this interest").
155. Id at 11 (majority opinion).
156. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
157. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749,752 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
It was said in that case that the question was one of difference between the races, not of
superiority or inferiority, and that the natural law which forbids their intermarriage and
the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races is as clearly divine as that
which imparted to them different natures.
Id. (citing with approval State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871) (not reported in N.E.)).
158. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
159. Id. at 8.
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case differently. After all, if the state could show that the interracial
marriage ban was not "in substance anti-black legislation,"l 60 then plaintiffs
could not have claimed that the statute was designed to subordinate one race
to another, 6 ' and rational basis would have appropriately been used. If
rational basis scrutiny were used, then the court would presumably have
deferred to the legislature's judgment about what was best for children
because it could not be shown beyond doubt that the legislature was wrong.
But this is a fundamental misunderstanding of Loving, where the Court made
clear that "[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause."' 62  The Loving Court was not saying that
interracial marriage bans were only unconstitutional when involving an
attempt to subordinate one race to another, but instead that they were
unconstitutional "even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the
'integrity' of all races." 63
In her masterful dissent, Chief Judge Kaye argued that the New York
law violated equal protection guarantees because it discriminated both on the
basis of gender and on the basis of orientation.16 She explained, "That the
statutory scheme applies equally to both sexes does not alter the conclusion
that the classification here is based on sex."l 65 Regrettably, the New York
court simply chose to ignore that its approach had already been rejected in
Loving. 166
160. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at I1.
161. Cf id ("Plaintiffs do not argue here that the legislation they challenge is designed to
subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class.").
162. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
163. Id. at 1I n.l1.
164. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 27 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
Homosexuals meet the constitutional definition of a suspect class, that is, a group whose
defining characteristic is "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as
others." Accordingly, any classification discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation
must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
Id. (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)) (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 29.
166. See id. ("The 'equal application' approach to equal protection analysis was expressly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Loving. . . .").
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4. Washington
The Washington Supreme Court offered an analysis much like that of
the New York Court of Appeals, rejecting the equal protection argument in a
cursory and conclusory fashion. The Washington court reasoned:
If plaintiffs' case were truly analogous to Loving, we would first
have to find that DOMA [the Washington statute banning same-sex
marriage] discriminates on the basis of sex and then conclude that
the right to marriage is violated because of the restriction due to sex
discrimination. However, as the State urges, DOMA treats men and
women the same." 67
Yet, Loving did not establish that differential racial treatment had to be
established before strict scrutiny would be employed for a racial
classification. On the contrary, the very use of a racial classification
triggered strict scrutiny, just as the very use of a racial classification in
McLaughlin had triggered strict scrutiny, equal application to the races
notwithstanding.168 But that means that the Washington court should indeed
have found that the statute classified on the basis of sex, thus triggering
closer scrutiny. The court would then have decided whether the state same-
sex marriage ban passed muster under this closer scrutiny.
Would the Washington court have struck down the statute when
employing closer scrutiny? While such a result is not foreordained simply
by virtue of the imposition of higher scrutiny, the court implied that it would
indeed have felt compelled to strike down the statute,169 perhaps because
Washington subjects gender classifications to strict scrutiny.170
It could be that the Washington jurisprudence for determining whether a
statute classifies on the basis of gender differs from the federal jurisprudence
in a crucial way, for example, by requiring that classifications affect the
sexes differently in order for higher scrutiny to be employed under state
constitutional guarantees. '7  Even if that were so, however, the federal
jurisprudence does not so require,172 which means that the Washington
statute should have been subjected to intermediate, if not strict, scrutiny.
167. Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006); see also Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571, 598 (Md. 2007) ("Nor does the statute, facially or in its application, place men and women
on an uneven playing field. Rather, the statute prohibits equally both men and women from the
same conduct.").
168. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
169. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989 (suggesting that in that case the court would "conclude that the
right to marriage is violated because of the restriction due to sex discrimination").
170. See Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 888 (Wash. 1975) ("[W]e hold that the classification
based upon sex ... is inherently suspect and therefore must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.").
171. See Andersen, 138 P.3d at 988 ("The purpose of the ERA 'is to end special treatment for or
discrimination against either sex. "') (citing Marchioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 491 (1978)).
172. See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
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5. California
In In re Marriage Cases,'73 the California Supreme Court understood
that the California statute precluded a man from marrying a man but not a
woman, and a woman from marrying a woman but not a man, 174 but
reasoned that there was no discrimination because no one could marry
someone of the same sex.17 The court understood that the Virginia statute
at issue in Loving permitted a white person to marry a white person and a
black person to marry a black person, but it precluded a white person from
marrying a black person.'76 However, the California court pointed out:
[T]he antimiscegenation statutes at issue in those cases plainly
treated members of minority races differently from White persons,
prohibiting only intermarriage that involved White persons in order
to prevent (in the undisguised words of the defenders of the statute
in Perez) "the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races
whose members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to
Caucasians."1 71
Regrettably, there was no discussion of whether the Virginia statute
would have been upheld had it been established that Virginia was trying to
preserve the purity of all races. Such a question would not have undermined
the California court's contention that Virginia's attempt to promote white
supremacy violated constitutional guarantees-rather, it simply would have
helped underscore that Virginia's statute was unconstitutional whether or not
it was trying to promote white supremacy. But since that is so, Loving is not
so easily distinguished because the state's attempt to promote racial
supremacy was sufficient, but not necessary, to establish the
unconstitutionality of the state's artificial restriction of marriage.
173. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, §
7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
174. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 436.
Plaintiffs argue that because a woman who wishes to marry another woman would be
permitted to do so if she were a man rather than a woman, and a man who wishes to
marry another man would be permitted to do so if he were a woman rather than a man,
the statutes must be seen as embodying discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id.
175. Id ("In drawing a distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples, the
challenged marriage statutes do not treat men and women differently. Persons of either gender are
treated equally and are permitted to marry only a person of the opposite gender.").
176. Id. at 437.
177. Id. (quoting Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 23 (Cal. 1948)).
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The California Supreme Court explained:
[C]ourts have recognized that a statute that treats a couple
differently based upon whether the couple consists of persons of the
same race or of different races generally reflects a policy
disapproving of the integration or close relationship of individuals
of different races in the setting in question, and as such properly is
viewed as embodying an instance of racial discrimination with
respect to the interracial couple and both of its members.,78
Yet, one would have thought from the court's previous analyses that
treating interracial couples differently from intra-racial couples would
involve racial discrimination only if there was some implicit or explicit
attempt to privilege one race over another. Without any such showing, one
still could claim that the statute was classifying on the basis of race but
would need more before one could show disparate impact upon one race or
another.
The California court contrasted the statute precluding interracial couples
from marrying with one precluding same-sex couples from marrying by
suggesting:
[A] statute or policy that treats men and women equally but that
accords differential treatment either to a couple based upon whether
it consists of persons of the same sex rather than opposite sexes, or
to an individual based upon whether he or she generally is sexually
attracted to persons of the same gender rather than the opposite
gender, is more accurately characterized as involving differential
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation rather than an instance
of sex discrimination, and properly should be analyzed on the
former ground. 179
Here, the court suggests that because there is no disparate impact on the
basis of sex and there is such an impact on the basis of orientation, the
statute should be examined in light of its discriminating on the basis of
orientation rather than sex. 80 Certainly, the court was correct to recognize
that such a statute would impose a burden on the LGBT community, but a
separate question is whether such a statute should in addition be examined in
light of its using a sex-based classification.
Consider a statute that precludes interracial marriage out of a desire to
protect the integrity of all races. For purposes here, let us assume that the
178. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437.
179. Id.; see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (Md. 2007) ("While Family Law § 2-201
does not draw a distinction based on sex, the legislation does differentiate implicitly on the basis of
sexual preference.").
180. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 606.
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statute is not designed to privilege one race over others and does not have
the effect of privileging one race over others. While such a statute classifies
on the basis of race, it ex hypothesi does not have a disparate racial impact.
Yet, Loving teaches that such a statute should be examined with strict
scrutiny even if it does not have a disparate racial impact and even if the
purpose behind it is to promote racial integrity generally.'8 ' But if that is so,
then the fact that the races are affected equally does not immunize a race-
based classification from strict scrutiny. So, too, even if in fact a same-sex
marriage ban affects the sexes equally, that should not immunize the statute
from scrutiny for using a sex-based classification.
Ironically, the California court did not even have to reach the question
of whether the state's same-sex marriage ban was classified on the basis of
sex 8 2 because the court held that orientation was a suspect classification
under the California Constitution.' One infers that the court wanted to
choose the "correct" classification to subject to strict scrutiny, as if a
classification could not discriminate on the basis of both sex and gender.' 8
A court believing that it had to choose the "correct" classification for
constitutional review when considering a same-sex marriage challenge
might be tempted to focus solely on the group on whom the burden has
primarily, if not exclusively, been imposed, namely, the LGBT community.
Yet, limiting one's focus to the intended target may well contradict the
existing jurisprudence. For example, no court would suggest that a race-
based or gender-based classification in a statute should be reviewed in light
of the rational basis test as long as the statute was designed to impose a
181. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
182. For example, the Iowa Supreme court did not address whether that state's same-sex marriage
ban offended equal protection guarantees on the basis of gender because the court found that
orientation was protected under the state constitution. See Vamum v. Brien 763 N.W.2d 862, 896
(Iowa 2009) ("Accordingly, we hold that legislative classifications based on sexual orientation must
be examined under a heightened level of scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution.").
183. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442 ("[S]exual orientation should be viewed as a suspect
classification for purposes of the California Constitution's equal protection clause and that statutes
that treat persons differently because of their sexual orientation should be subjected to strict scrutiny
under this constitutional provision."). By the same token, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts did not address whether that state's same-sex marriage ban should be examined with
heightened scrutiny because it found that the ban could not even pass rational basis review. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) ("[W]e conclude that the
marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection. Because
the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not consider the plaintiffs' arguments that
this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.").
184. But see supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Judge Kaye's dissenting
opinion in Hernandez in which she suggested that the New York same-sex marriage ban
discriminated on the basis of both sex and gender).
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burden on the poor.' So, too, a classification normally triggering closer
scrutiny should not be subjected to more deferential review merely because
the group intended to bear most of the burden has not yet been held to
trigger more careful review.
One of the difficulties posed by an analysis requiring that disparate
impact be shown before the level of scrutiny is raised is that the higher level
of scrutiny is imposed to discover some of the non-obvious adverse effects
of employing certain classifications. Consider, for example, the former
admissions policy of the Mississippi University for Women (MUW), which
precluded males from taking nursing courses for credit.186 On its face, such
a policy might seem to advantage rather than disadvantage women.'87 Yet,
the Mississippi University for Women Court worried that MUW's
"admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that women, not men,
should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for
women a self-fulfilling prophecy."' 88  The Court has made clear that when
"determining the validity of a gender-based classification,"' 89 the analysis
"must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females."' 90 Such an analysis cannot be properly performed if the
Court is going to approach classifications based on gender with a deferential
eye.
The Supreme Court has suggested, "'Inherent differences' between men
and women ... remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's
opportunity." ' At least one issue to be examined is whether same-sex
marriage bans are based on stereotypical understandings of the roles of the
men and women, either as parents 92 or as romantic partners.' 93 But analysis
185. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (holding that poverty
is not a suspect classification).
186. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720-21 (1982).
Respondent, Joe Hogan, is a registered nurse but does not hold a baccalaureate degree in
nursing. Since 1974, he has worked as a nursing supervisor in a medical center in
Columbus, the city in which MUW is located. In 1979, Hogan applied for admission to
the MUW School of Nursing's baccalaureate program. Although he was otherwise
qualified, he was denied admission to the School of Nursing solely because of his sex.
School officials informed him that he could audit the courses in which he was interested,
but could not enroll for credit.
Id
187. Id. at 727 ("The State's primary justification for maintaining the single-sex admissions policy
of MUW's School of Nursing is that it compensates for discrimination against women and,
therefore, constitutes educational affirmative action.").
188. Id. at 730.
189. Id. at 724.
190. Id. at 724-25.
191. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (emphasis added).
192. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal by the New York
Court of Appeals to give sufficient credit to the parenting abilities of LGBT parents, evidence
supporting those abilities notwithstanding).
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of whether particular classifications promote fixed notions about the proper
roles of the sexes is much less likely to take place under rational basis
review, 194 which is one of the reasons that closer scrutiny is employed for
sex-based classifications.
IV. CONCLUSION
Same-sex marriage bans impose significant and undeserved burdens on
LGBT families and should be struck down. Arguably, orientation should be
treated as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, because the class has the
relevant indicia as much as or more than some of those classes already
recognized.
A separate question, however, is whether same-sex marriage bans
should trigger closer scrutiny because they are based on a protected
classification. Those courts denying that such scrutiny should be employed
have suggested that men must be treated differently from women in order for
heightened scrutiny to be triggered. But the argument that express
classifications applied equally do not trigger close scrutiny was rejected
decades ago. Unless the United States Supreme Court makes clear that this
is a fundamental misunderstanding of how equal protection guarantees work,
it seems safe to assume that some courts will try to adopt this kind of
approach in other cases.
To say that closer scrutiny should be employed when express sex-based
classifications are employed is not to say that such classifications must be
struck down. Rather it is merely to say that the state's burden is higher
when it chooses to use a presumptively invalid classification.'95 As long as
a state can offer "an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification,"' 96 the same-sex marriage ban will pass muster, at least on
federal grounds.
Express use of a protected classification triggers closer scrutiny, and any
contrary holding will return us to an age when "separate but equal" will only
result in deferential review. Presumably, no one would advocate returning
to that bygone era, and it is nothing short of amazing that some courts,
193. See Linda C. McClain, The "Male Problematic" and the Problems of Family Law: A
Response to Don Browning's "Critical Familism," 56 EMORY L.J. 1407, 1410-11 (2007)
(discussing the view that women are supposed to domesticate men).
194. Cf Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) ("[P]laintiffs fail to show that
gay and lesbian persons are excluded from marriage on account of or in order to perpetuate gender
stereotyping.").
195. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
196. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982).
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whether upholding or striking down same-sex marriage bans, do not
appreciate that their reasoning commits us to a return to a jurisprudence that
has been repudiated for decades.
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